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Abstract
Online services such as web search and e-commerce ap-
plications typically rely on the collection of data about
users, including details of their activities on the web.
Such personal data is used to enhance the quality of ser-
vice via personalization of content and to maximize rev-
enues via better targeting of advertisements and deeper
engagement of users on sites. To date, service providers
have largely followed the approach of either requiring
or requesting consent for opting-in to share their data.
Users may be willing to share private information in re-
turn for better quality of service or for incentives, or
in return for assurances about the nature and extend of
the logging of data. We introduce stochastic privacy,
a new approach to privacy centering on a simple con-
cept: A guarantee is provided to users about the upper-
bound on the probability that their personal data will
be used. Such a probability, which we refer to as pri-
vacy risk, can be assessed by users as a preference or
communicated as a policy by a service provider. Ser-
vice providers can work to personalize and to optimize
revenues in accordance with preferences about privacy
risk. We present procedures, proofs, and an overall sys-
tem for maximizing the quality of services, while re-
specting bounds on allowable or communicated privacy
risk. We demonstrate the methodology with a case study
and evaluation of the procedures applied to web search
personalization. We show how we can achieve near-
optimal utility of accessing information with provable
guarantees on the probability of sharing data.
Introduction
Online services such as web search, recommendation en-
gines, social networks, and e-commerce applications typi-
cally rely on the collection of data about activities ( e.g.,
click logs, queries, and browsing information) and per-
sonal information (e.g., location and demographics) of users.
The availability of such data enables providers to person-
alize services to individuals and also to learn how to en-
hance the service for all users (e.g., improved search re-
sults relevance). User data is also important to providers
for optimizing revenues via better targeted advertising, ex-
tended user engagement and popularity, and even the sell-
ing of user data to third party companies. Permissions are
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typically obtained via broad consent agreements that re-
quest user permission to share their data through system
dialogs, or via complex Terms of Service. Such notices
are typically difficult to understand and ignored by more
than 40 percent of users (Technet 2012). In other cases, a
plethora of requests for information such as user location
may be shown in system dialogs at run-time or installation
time. Beyond the normal channels for sharing data, poten-
tial breaches of information are possible via attacks by ma-
licious third parties and malware, and through surprising
situations such as the AOL data release (Arrington 2006;
Adar 2007) and de-anonymization of released Netflix logs
(Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008). The charges by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission against Facebook (FTC 2011) and
Google (FTC 2012) highlight increasing concerns by pri-
vacy advocates and government institutions about the large-
scale recording of personal data.
Ideal approaches to privacy in online services would en-
able users to benefit from machine learning over data from
populations of users, yet consider users’ preferences as a
top priority. Prior research in this realm has focused on
designing privacy-preserving methodologies that can pro-
vide for control of a privacy-utility tradeoff (Adar 2007;
Krause and Horvitz 2008). Research has also explored
the feasibility of incorporating user preferences over what
type of data can be logged (Xu et al. 2007; Cooper 2008;
Olson, Grudin, and Horvitz 2005; Krause and Horvitz 2008).
We introduce a new approach to privacy that we refer to as
stochastic privacy. Stochastic privacy centers on the simple
idea of providing a guarantee to users about the maximum
likelihood that their data will be accessed and used by a ser-
vice provider. We refer to this measure as the assessed or
communicated privacy risk, which may be increased in re-
turn for increases in the quality of service or other incentives.
Very small probabilities of sharing data may be tolerated by
individuals (just as lightning strikes are tolerated as a rare
event), yet offer providers sufficient information to optimize
over a large population of users. Stochastic privacy depends
critically on harnessing inference and decision making to
make choices about data collection within the constraints of
a guaranteed privacy risk.
We explore procedures that can be employed by service
providers when preferences about the sharing of data are
represented as privacy risk. The goal is to maximize the
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Figure 1: Overview of stochastic privacy.
utility of service using data extracted from a population of
users, while abiding by the agreement reached with users on
privacy risk. We show that optimal selection of users under
these constraints is NP-hard and thus intractable, given the
massive size of the online systems. As a solution, we pro-
pose two procedures, RANDGREEDY and SPGREEDY, that
combine greedy value of information analysis with obfus-
cation to offer mechanisms for tractable optimization, while
satisfying stochastic privacy guarantees. We present perfor-
mance bounds for the expected utility achievable by these
procedures compared to the optimal solution. Our contribu-
tions can be summarized as follows:
• Introduction of stochastic privacy, an approach that rep-
resents preferences about the probability that data will be
shared, and methods for trading off privacy risk, incen-
tives, and quality of service.
• A tractable end-to-end system for implementing a version
of stochastic privacy in online services.
• RANDGREEDY and SPGREEDY procedures for sampling
users under the constraints of stochastic privacy, with the-
oretical guarantees on the acquired utility.
• Evaluation to demonstrate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed procedures on a case study of user selection for
personalization in web search.
Stochastic Privacy Overview
Figure 1 provides an overview of stochastic privacy in the
context of a particular design of a system that implements
the methodology. The design is composed of three main
components: (i) a user preference component, (ii) a system
preference component, and (iii) an optimization component
for guiding the system’s data collection. We now provide de-
tails about each of the components and then formally specify
the optimization problem for selective sampling module.
User Preference Component
The user preference component interacts with users (e.g.,
during signup) and establishes an agreement between a user
and service provider on a tolerated probability that the user’s
data will be shared in return for better quality of service or
incentives. Representing and capturing users’ tolerated pri-
vacy risk allows users to move beyond the binary choice
of yes or no on the sharing of data. The incentives offered
to users can be personalized based on the metalevel in-
formation available for a user (e.g., general location infor-
mation inferred from a previously shared IP address) and
can vary from guarantees of improved service (Krause and
Horvitz 2010) to complementary software and entries in a
lottery to win cash prizes (as done by the comScore service
(Wikipedia-comScore 2006)).
Formally, let W be the population of users signed-up for
a service. Each user w ∈ W is represented with the tuple
{rw, cw, ow}, where ow is the metadata information (e.g.,
IP address) available for user w prior to selecting and log-
ging finer-grained data about the user. rw is the privacy risk
assessed by the user, and cw is the corresponding incentive
provided in return for the user assuming the risk. The ele-
ments of this tuple can be updated through interactions be-
tween the system and the user. For simplicity of analysis, we
shall assume that the poolW and user preferences are static.
System Preference Component
The goal of the service provider is to optimize the quality
of service. For example, a provider may wish to personalize
web search and to improve the targeting of advertising for
maximization of revenue. The service provider may record
the activities of a subset of users (e.g., sets of queries issued,
sites browsed, etc.) and use this data to provide better ser-
vice globally or to a specific cohort of users. We model the
private data of activity logs of user w by variable lw ∈ 2L,
where L represents the web-scale space of activities (e.g.,
set of queries issued, sites browsed, etc.) . However, lw is
observed by the system only after w is selected and the data
from w is logged. We model the system’s uncertain belief
of lw by a random variable Yw, with lw being its realiza-
tion distributed according to conditional probability distri-
bution P (Yw = lw|ow). In order to make an informed de-
cision about user selection, the distribution P (Yw = lw|ow)
is learned by the system using data available from the user
and recorded logs of other users. We quantify the utility
of application by logging activities LS from selected users
S through function g : 2L → R, given by g(⋃s∈S ls).
The expected value of the utility that the system can ex-
pect to gain by selecting users S with observed attributes
OS is characterized by distribution P and utility function
g as: g˜(S) ≡ EYS
[
g(
⋃
s∈S ls)
]
=
∑
LS∈2L×S
(
P (YS =
LS |OS) · g(
⋃
s∈S ls)
)
. However, the application itself may
be using the logs LS in a complex manner (such as training a
ranker (Bennett et al. 2011)) and evaluating this on complex
user metrics (Hassan and White 2013). Hence, the system
uses a surrogate utility function f(S) ≈ g˜(S) to capture
the utility through a simple metric, for example, coverage
of query-clicks obtained from the sampled users (Singla and
White 2010) or reduction in uncertainty of click phenomena
(Krause and Horvitz 2008).
In our model, we require that the set function f to be non-
negative, monotone (i.e., whenever A ⊆ A′ ⊆ W , it holds
that f(A) ≤ f(A′)) and submodular. Submodularity is an
intuitive notion of diminishing returns, stating that, for any
sets A ⊆ A′ ⊆ W , and any given user a /∈ A′, it holds
that f(A ∪ {a}) − f(A) ≥ f(A′ ∪ {a}) − f(A′). These
conditions are general, satisfied by many realistic, as well as
complex utility functions (Krause and Guestrin 2007), such
as reduction in click entropy (Krause and Horvitz 2008). As
a concrete example, consider the setting where attributes O
represent geo-coordinates of the users and D : O ×O → R
computes the geographical distance between any two users.
The goal of the service provider is to provide location-
based personalization of web search. For such an applica-
tion, click information from local users provides valuable
signals for personalizing search (Bennett et al. 2011). The
system’s goal is to select a set of users S, and to leverage
data from these users to enhance the service for the pop-
ulation. For search queries originating from any other user
w, it uses the click data from the nearest user in S, given
by arg mins∈S D(os, ow). One approach for finding such a
set S is solving the k-medoid problem which aims to min-
imize the sum of pairwise distances between selected set
and the remaining population (Mirzasoleiman et al. 2013;
Kaufman and Rousseeuw 2009). Concretely, this can be cap-
tured by the following submodular utility function:
f(S) =
1
|W |
∑
w∈W
(
min
x∈X
D(ox, ow)− min
s∈S∪X
D(os, ow)
)
(1)
Here, X is any one (or a set of) fixed reference location(s),
for example, simply representing origin coordinates and is
used ensure that function f is non-negative and monotone.
Lemma 1 formally states the properties of this function.
Optimization Component
To make informed decisions about data access, the system
computes the expected value of information (VOI) of log-
ging the activities of a particular user, i.e., the marginal util-
ity that the application can expect by logging the activity
of this user (Krause and Horvitz 2008). In the absence of
sufficient information about user attributes, the VOI may be
small, and hence needs to be learned from the data. The sys-
tem can randomly sample a small set of users from the pop-
ulation that can be used to learn and improve the models
of VOI computation (explorative sampling in Figure 1). For
example, for optimizing the service for a user cohort speak-
ing a specific language, the system may choose to collect
logs from a subset of users to learn how languages spoken
by users map to geography. If preferences about privacy risk
were not being regarded, VOI can be used to select which
users to log with a goal of maximizing the utility for the
service provider (selective sampling in Figure 1). Given that
the utility function of the system is submodular, a greedy
selection rule makes near-optimal decisions about data ac-
cess (Krause and Guestrin 2007). However, this simple ap-
proach could violate the privacy guarantees made with users.
To act in accordance with the assessed privacy risk, we de-
sign selective sampling procedures that couple obfuscation
with VOI analysis to select the set of users to provide data.
The system needs to ensure that both the explorative and
selective sampling approaches respect the privacy guaran-
tees made to users: the likelihood of sampling any user w
throughout the execution of the system must be less than the
privacy risk factor rw. The system tracks the sampling risk
(likelihood of sampling) that user w faces during phases of
the execution of explorative sampling, denoted rESw , and se-
lective sampling, denoted rSSw . The privacy guarantee for a
user is preserved as long as: rw−
(
1−(1−rESw )·(1−rSSw )
) ≥
0. This difference between the assessed risk and risk faced
by a user can be viewed as the sampling budget of that user.
Optimization Problem for Selective Sampling
We now focus primarily on the selective sampling module
and formally introduce the optimization problem. The goal
is to design a sampling procedure M that abides by guar-
antees of stochastic privacy, yet optimizes the utility of the
application in decisions about accessing user data. Given a
budget constraint B, the goal is to select users SM :
SM = arg max
S⊆W
f(S) (2)
subject to
∑
s∈S
cs ≤ B and rw − rMw ≥ 0 ∀w ∈W.
Here, rMw is the likelihood of selecting w ∈ W by proce-
dure M and hence rw − rMw ≥ 0 captures the constraint
of stochastic privacy guarantee for w. Note that we inter-
changeably write utility acquired by procedure as f(M) to
denote f(SM ) where SM is the set of users selected by run-
ning M . We shall now consider a simpler setting of con-
stant privacy risk rate r for all users and unit cost per user
(thus reducing the budget constraint to a simpler cardinal
constraint, given by |S| ≤ B). These assumptions lead to
definingB ≤W ·r, as that is the maximum possible set size
that can be sampled by any procedure for Problem 2.
Selective Sampling with Stochastic Privacy
We shall now propose desiderata of the selection procedures,
discuss the hardness of the problem and review several dif-
ferent tractable approaches, as summarized in Table 1.
Desirable Properties of Sampling Procedures
The problem defined by Equation 2 requires solving an NP-
hard discrete optimization problem, even when stochastic
privacy constraint is removed. The algorithm for finding the
optimal solution of this problem without the privacy con-
straint, referred as OPT, is intractable (Feige 1998). We ad-
dress this intractability by exploiting the submodular struc-
ture of the utility function f and offer procedures providing
provable near-optimal solutions in polynomial time. We aim
at designing procedures that satisfy the following desirable
properties: (i) provides competitive utility w.r.t. OPT with
provable guarantees, (ii) preserves stochastic privacy guar-
antees, and (iii) runs in polynomial time.
Procedure Competitive utility Privacy guarantees Polynomial runtime
OPT 3 7 7 O(|W |B)
GREEDY 3 7 3 O(B · |W |)
RANDOM 7 3 3 O(B)
RANDGREEDY 3 3 3 O(B · |W | · r)
SPGREEDY 3 3 3 O(B · |W | · log(1/r))
Table 1: Properties of different procedures. RANDGREEDY and SPGREEDY satisfy all the desirable properties.
Random Sampling: RANDOM
RANDOM simply samples the users at random, without any
consideration of cost and utility. The likelihood of any user
w to be selected by the algorithm is rRANDOMw = B/W and
hence privacy risk guarantees are trivially satisfied since
B ≤ W · r as defined in Problem 2). In general, RANDOM
can perform arbitrarily poorly in terms of acquired utility,
specifically for applications targeting particular user cohorts.
Greedy Selection: GREEDY
Next, we explore a greedy sampling strategy that maxi-
mizes the expected marginal utility at each iteration to guide
the decision about selecting a next user to log. Formally,
GREEDY starts with empty set S = ∅. At an iteration
i, it greedily selects a user s∗i = arg maxw⊆W\S f(S ∪
w) − f(S) and adds it to the current selection of users
S = S ∪ {s∗i }. It stops when |S| = B.
A fundamental result by Nemhauser, Wolsey, and Fisher
(1978) states that the utility obtained by this greedy selection
strategy is guaranteed to be at least (1− 1/e) (= 0.63) times
that obtained by OPT. This result is tight under reasonable
complexity assumptions (P 6= NP ) (Feige 1998). How-
ever, such a greedy selection clearly violates the stochas-
tic privacy constraint in Problem 2—consider the user w∗
with highest marginal value: w∗ = arg maxw⊆W f(w). The
likelihood that this user will be selected by the algorithm
rGREEDYw∗ = 1, regardless of the requested privacy risk rw∗ .
Sampling and Greedy Selection: RANDGREEDY
We combine the ideas of RANDOM and GREEDY to design
procedure RANDGREEDY which provides guarantees on
stochastic privacy and competitive utility. RANDGREEDY is
an iterative procedure that samples a small batch of users
ψ(s) at each iteration, then greedily selects s∗ ∈ ψ(s) and
removes the entire set ψ(s) for further consideration. By
keeping the batch size ψ(s) ≤ W · r/B, the procedure en-
sures that the privacy guarantees are satisfied. As our user
poolW is static, to reduce complexity, we consider a simpler
version of RANDGREEDY that defers the greedy selection.
Formally, this is equivalent to first sampling the users from
W at rate r to create a subset W˜ such that |W˜ | = |W | · r,
and then, running the GREEDY algorithm on W˜ to greedily
select a set of users of size B.
The initial random sampling ensures a guarantee on the
privacy risk for users during the execution of the procedure.
In fact, for any user w ∈ W , the likelihood of w being sam-
pled and included in subset W˜ is rRANDGREEDYw ≤ r. We fur-
ther analyze the utility obtained by this procedure in the next
section and show that, under reasonable assumptions, the ap-
proach can provide competitive utility compared to OPT.
Greedy Selection with Obfuscation: SPGREEDY
SPGREEDY uses an inverse approach of mixing RANDOM
and GREEDY: it does greedy selection, followed by obfusca-
tion, as illustrated in Procedure 1. It assumes an underlying
distance metric D : W ×W → R which captures the notion
of distance or dissimilarity among users. As in GREEDY, it
operates in iterations and selects the element s∗ with max-
imum marginal utility at each iteration. However, to ensure
stochastic privacy, it obfuscates s∗ with similar users using
distance metric D to create a set ψ(s∗) of size 1/r, then sam-
ples one user randomly from ψ(s∗) and removes the entire
set ψ(s∗) for further consideration.
The guarantees on privacy risk hold by the following ar-
guments: During the execution of the algorithm, any user w
becomes a possible candidate of being selected if the user is
part of ψ(s∗) in some iteration (e.g., iteration i). Given that
|ψ(s∗)| ≥ 1/r and algorithm randomly sample v ∈ ψ(s∗),
the likelihood of w being selected in iteration i is at most r.
The fact that set ψ(s∗) is removed from available pool W˜ at
the end of the iteration ensures that w can become a possible
candidate of selection only once.
Procedure 1: SPGREEDY
1 Input: users W ; cardinality constraint B; privacy
risk r; distance metric D : W ×W → R;
2 Initialize:
• Outputs: selected users S ← ∅;
• Variables: remaining users W ′ ←W ;
begin
3 while |S| ≤ B do
4 s∗ ← arg maxw∈W ′ f(S ∪ w)− f(S);
5 Set ψ(s∗)← s∗;
6 while |ψ(s∗)| < 1/r do
7 v ← arg minw∈W ′\ψ(s∗)D(w, s∗);
8 ψ(s∗)← ψ(s∗) ∪ {v};
9 Randomly select s˜∗ ∈ ψ(s∗);
10 S ← S ∪ {s˜∗};
11 W ′ ←W ′ \ ψ(s∗);
12 Output: S
Performance Analysis
We now analyze the performance of the proposed proce-
dures in terms of the utility acquired compared to that of
the OPT as baseline. We first analyze the problem in a gen-
eral setting and then under a set of practical assumptions on
the structure of underlying utility function f and population
of users W . The proofs of all the results are available at 1.
1Available anonymously at:
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General Case
In the general setting, we show that one cannot do better than
r ·f(OPT ) in the worst case. Consider a population of users
W where only one user w∗ has utility value of 1, and rest of
the usersW \w∗ have utility of 0. The OPT gets a utility of 1
by selecting SOPT = {w∗}. Consider any procedure M that
has to respect the guarantees on privacy risk. If the privacy
rate of w∗ is r, then M can select w∗ with only a maximum
probability of r. Hence, the maximum expected utility that
any procedure M for Problem 2 can achieve is r.
On a positive note, a trivial algorithm can always achieve
a utility of (1− 1/e) · r · f(OPT ) in expectation. This result
can be achieved by running GREEDY to select a set SGREEDY
and then choosing the final solution to be SGREEDY with prob-
ability r, and else output an empty set. Theorem 1 formally
states these results for the general problem setting.
Theorem 1. Consider the Problem 2 of optimizing a sub-
modular function f under cardinality constraint B and pri-
vacy risk rate r. For any distribution of marginal utilities of
populationW , a trivial procedure can achieve expected util-
ity of at least (1− 1/e) · r · f(OPT ). In contrast, there exists
an underlying distribution for which no procedure can have
expected utility of more than r · f(OPT ).
Smoothness and Diversification Assumptions
In practice, we can hope to do much better than the worst-
case results described in Theorem 1 by exploiting the under-
lying structures of users attributes and utility function. We
start with the assumption that there exists a distance metric
D : W × W → R which captures the notion of distance
or dissimilarity among users. For any given w ∈ W , let
us define its α-neighborhood to be the set of users within
a distance α from w (i.e., α-close to w): Nα(w) = {v :
D(v, w) ≤ α}. We assume that population of users is large
and that the number of users in the Nα(w) is large. We for-
mally capture these requirements in Theorems 2,3.
Firstly, we consider utility functions that change grace-
fully with changes in inputs, similar to the notion of λ-
Lipschitz set functions used in Mirzasoleiman et al. (2013).
We formalize the notion of smoothness in the utility function
f w.r.t metric D as follows:
Definition 1. For any given set of users S, let us consider
a set S˜α obtained by replacing every s ∈ S with any w ∈
Nα(s). Then, |f(S)−f(S˜α)| ≤ λf ·α·|S|, where parameter
λf captures the notion of smoothness of function f .
Secondly, we consider utility functions that favor diver-
sity or dissimilarity of users in the subset selection w.r.t the
distance metric D. We formalize this notion of diversifica-
tion in the utility function as follows:
Definition 2. Let us consider any given set of users S ⊆
W and a user w ∈ W . Let α = mins∈S D(s, w). Then,
f(S ∪ w) − f(S) ≤ Υf · α, where parameter Υf captures
the notion of diversification of function f .
The utility function f introduced in Equation 1 satisfies
both the above assumptions as formally stated below.
Lemma 1. Consider the utility function f in Equation 1.
f is submodular, and satisfies the properties of smoothness
and diversification, i.e. has bounded λf and Υf .
We note that for the functions with unbounded λ and Υ
(i.e., λf → ∞ and Υf → ∞), it would lead to the general
problem settings (equivalent to no assumptions) and hence
results of Theorem 1 apply.
Performance Bounds
Under the assumption of smoothness (i.e., bounded λf ), we
can show the following bound on utility of RANDGREEDY:
Theorem 2. Consider the Problem 2 for function f with
bounded λf . Let SOPT be the set returned by OPT for Prob-
lem 2 after relaxing privacy constraints. For a desired  < 1,
let αrg = arg minα{α : |Nα(s)| ≥ 1/r · log(B/) ∀s ∈
SOPT, where Nα(si) ∩ Nα(sj) = ∅ ∀si, sj ∈ SOPT}. Then,
with probability at least (1− ),
E[f(RANDGREEDY)] ≥ (1− 1/e) ·(f(OPT)−αrg ·λf ·B).
Under the assumption of smoothness and diversification
(i.e., bounded λf and Υf ), we can show the following bound
on utility of SPGREEDY:
Theorem 3. Consider the Problem 2 for function f with
bounded λf and Υf . Let SGREEDY be the set returned
by GREEDY for Problem 2. Let αspg = arg minα{α :
|Nα(s)| ≥ 1/r ∀s ∈ SGREEDY}. Then,
E[f(SPGREEDY)] ≥ (1−1/e)·f(OPT)−(2·λf+Υf )·αspg·B.
Intuitively, these results imply that both RANDGREEDY
and SPGREEDY achieve competitive utility w.r.t OPT, and
the performance degrades smoothly as the privacy risk r is
decreased or the bounds on smoothness and diversification
increase.
Experimental Evaluation
We shall now report on experiments we performed to build
insights about the performance of the stochastic privacy pro-
cedures on a case study of the selective collection of user
data in support of web search personalization.
Benchmarks and Metrics
We compare the performance of the RANDGREEDY and SP-
GREEDY procedures against the baselines of RANDOM and
GREEDY. While RANDOM provides a trivial lower bench-
mark for any procedure, GREEDY is a natural upper bound
on the utility, given that the OPT itself is intractable. To ana-
lyze the robustness of our procedures, we then vary the level
of privacy risk r. We further carried out experiments to un-
derstand the loss incurred from obfuscation phase during the
execution of SPGREEDY.
Experimental Setup
We considered the application of providing location-based
personalization for queries issued for the business domain
(e.g., real-estate, financial services, etc.). The goal is to se-
lect a set of users S who are expert web search users in this
domain. We seek to leverage the click data from these users
to improve the relevance of search results shown to those
searching for local businesses. The experiments are based
on using a surrogate utility function as introduced in Equa-
tion 1. As we are interested in specific domain of business-
related queries, we modify the utility function in Equation 1
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Figure 2: In Fig. 2(a), for a fixed r = 1/10000, budget B or number of users selected in increased, showing the competitiveness
of our procedures w.r.t GREEDY. In Fig. 2(b), a fixed B = 50 is used, and level of privacy risk r is reduced. The results
demonstrate that the performance of RANDGREEDY and SPGREEDY degrades smoothly. Fig. 2(c) analyze the execution of the
procedure SPGREEDY and illustrates that the loss incurred in marginal utility at every step via obfuscation is very low.
by restricting S to users who are experts in the domain, as
further described below. The acquired utility can be inter-
preted as the average reduction in the distance for any user
w in the population to the nearest expert s ∈ S.
The primary source of data for this study is obtained from
interaction logs on a major web search engine. We consid-
ered a fraction of users who issued at least one query in
month of October 2013, restricted to queries coming from IP
addresses located within ten neighboring states in the west-
ern region of the United States. This resulted in a pool W of
seven million users. We considered a setting where system
has access to metadata information of geo-coordinates of the
users, as well as a probe of the last 20 search-result clicks for
each user, which together constitutes the observed attributes
of user denoted as ow. Each of these clicks are then classi-
fied into a topical hierarchy from a popular web directory,
the Open Directory Project (ODP) (dmoz.org), using auto-
mated techniques (Bennett, Svore, and Dumais 2010). With
a similar objective to White, Dumais, and Teevan (2009),
the system then uses this classification to identify users who
are expert in the business domain. We used a simple rule of
classifying a user as an expert if at least one click was issued
in the domain of interest. With this, the system marks a set
of users W ′ ⊆ W as experts, and the set S in Equation 1
is restricted to W ′. We note that the specific thresholds or
variable choices do not affect the overall results below.
Results
We now discuss the findings from our experiments.
Varying the budget B: In our first set of experiments,
we vary the budget B, or equivalently the number of users
selected, and measured the utility acquired by different pro-
cedures. The privacy risk rate is set fixed to r = 1/10000. Fig-
ure 2(a) illustrates that both RANDGREEDY and SPGREEDY
are competitive w.r.t GREEDY and clearly outperform naive
baseline of RANDOM.
Varying the privacy risk r: We then vary the level of
privacy risk, for a fixed budget B = 50, to measure the ro-
bustness of the RANDGREEDY and SPGREEDY. The results
in Figure 2(b) demonstrate that the performance of RAND-
GREEDY and SPGREEDY degrades smoothly, as per the per-
formance analysis in Theorems 2,3.
Analyzing performance of SPGREEDY: Lastly, we
perform experiments to understand the execution of SP-
GREEDY and the loss incurred from the obfuscation step.
SPGREEDY removes 1/r users from pool at every iteration.
As a result, for small privacy risk r, the relative loss from
obfuscation (i.e., relative % difference in marginal utility ac-
quired by a user chosen by greedy selection, compared to
one finally picked after obfuscation) could possibly increase
over the execution of procedure as illustrated in Figure 2(a),
using a moving average of window size 10. However, the
diminishing returns property of the utility ensures that SP-
GREEDY incurs very low absolute loss in marginal utility
from obfuscation at every step.
Discussion
We introduced stochastic privacy, a new approach to pri-
vacy that centers on service providers abiding by guarantees
about not exceeding a specified likelihood of logging data,
and maximizing information collection in accordance with
these guarantees. We presented procedures and an overall
system design for maximizing the quality of services while
respecting privacy risks agreed with populations of users.
Directions for this research include the assessments of
user preferences about the probability of sharing data, in-
cluding how users trade increases in privacy risk for en-
hanced service and monetary incentives. Directions also in-
clude exploring the rich space of designs for interactive and
longer-term controls and settings of a tolerated risk of shar-
ing data. Opportunities include policies and analyses based
on the sharing of data as a privacy risk rate over time. As an
example, systems might one day consider decisions about
logging one or more search sessions of users where privacy
risk is assessed in terms of the risk of sharing search sessions
over time. In another research direction, designs can include
models where users are notified when they are selected to
share data and are provided with a special reward and option
of declining to share at that time. Iterative analyses can be
developed where subsets of users are actively engaged with
the option to assume higher levels of privacy risk or to sim-
ply provide additional information in return for special in-
centives. Inferences about the likely preferences on privacy
risk and about incentives for subpopulations could be folded
into the selection procedures.
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Proof of Lemma 1
We prove Lemma 1 by proving three other Lemmas 2 3 4 that are not in the main paper. In Lemma 2, by using the decompos-
able property of the function f from Equation 1, we prove that the function f is non-negative, monotonous (non-decreasing)
and submodular. Then, we show that the function satisfies the properties of smoothness (in Lemma 3) and diversification (in
Lemma 4) by showing an upper bound on the values of the parameters λf and Υf .
Lemma 2. Utility function f in Equation 1 is non-negative, monotone (non-decreasing) and submodular.
Proof. We begin by noting that f is decomposable, i.e., it can be written as a sum of simpler functions fw as:
f(S) =
∑
w∈W
fw(S) (3)
where fw(S) is given by:
fw(S) =
1
|W |
(
min
x∈X
D(ox, ow)− min
s∈S∪X
D(os, ow)
)
(4)
Next, we prove that each of these functions fw is non-negative, non-decreasing and submodular. To prove that the function is
non-decreasing, consider any two sets S ⊆ S′ ⊆W . Then,
fw(S
′)− fw(S) = 1|W |
(
min
s∈S∪X
D(os, ow)− min
s∈S′∪X
D(os, ow)
)
≥ 0 (5)
In step 5, the inequality holds as the distance to the nearest user for w in S′ cannot be more than that in S, hence proving that
fw is non-decreasing. Also, it is easy to see that fw(∅) = 0, which along with the non-decreasing property, ensures that the
function fw is non-negative.
To prove that the function is submodular, consider any two sets S ⊆ S′ ⊆ W , and any given user v ∈ W \ S′. When
fw(S
′ ∪ {v}) − fw(S′) = 0, submodularity holds trivially as we have fw(S ∪ {v}) − fw(S) ≥ 0 using non-decreasing
property. Let us consider the case when fw(S′ ∪ {v}) − fw(S′) > 0, i.e., v is assigned as the nearest user to w from the set
S′ ∪ {v}, given by v = mins∈S′∪{v}∪X D(os, ow). In this case, it would also be the case that v is the nearest user to w from
the set S ∪ {v}. Then, we can write down the difference of marginal gains as follows:(
fw(S
′ ∪ {v})− fw(S′)
)
−
(
fw(S ∪ {v})− fw(S)
)
=
(
1
|W |
(
D(ov, ow)− min
s∈S′∪X
D(os, ow)
))
−
(
1
|W |
(
D(ov, ow)− min
s∈S∪X
D(os, ow)
))
=
1
|W |
(
min
s∈S∪X
D(os, ow)− min
s∈S′∪X
D(os, ow)
)
≤ 0 (6)
In step 6, the inequality holds as the function is non-decreasing, thus showing that the marginal gains diminish and hence
proving the submodularity of the function fw.
By using the fact that these properties are preserved under linear combination with non-negative weights (all equal to 1 from
Equation 3), f is non-negative, non-decreasing and submodular.
Lemma 3. Utility function f in Equation 1 satisfies the properties of smoothness, i.e. has bounded λf .
Proof. For any given set of users S, let us consider a set S˜α obtained by replacing every s ∈ S with any w ∈ Nα(s). The goal
is to show that |f(S)− f(S˜α)| ≤ λf · α · |S| always holds for a fixed and bounded λf .
Let us again use the simpler functions fw from decomposition of f in Equation 3 and consider the difference |fw(S)−fw(S˜α)|.
Then,
|fw(S)− fw(S˜α)| ≤ α|W | (7)
In step 7, the inequality holds as the deviation in distance to the nearest user for w in S˜α cannot be more than α. Using this
result, we have
|f(S)− f(S˜α)| = |
∑
w∈W
fw(S)−
∑
w∈W
f(S˜α)|
≤
∑
w∈W
|fw(S)− fw(S˜α)|
≤
∑
w∈W
α
|W | (8)
= α ≤ α · |S| (9)
The inequality in step 8 holds by using the result of step 7 and inequality in step 9 holds trivially as |S| ≥ 1. Hence, the
smoothness parameter of the function λf is bounded by 1.
Lemma 4. Utility function f in Equation 1 satisfies the properties of diversification, i.e. has bounded Υf .
Proof. For any given set of users S and any new user v ∈ W \ S, let us define α = mins∈S D(s, v). The goal is to show that
f(S ∪ v)− f(S) ≤ Υf · α always holds for a fixed and bounded Υf .
Again, let us consider the function fw and consider the marginal of adding v to S, given by fw(S ∪ v)− fw(S). When v is not
the nearest user to w in the set S ∪{v}, we have f(S ∪{v})− f(S) = 0. Let’s consider the case where fw(S ∪ v)− f(S) > 0,
i.e., v is assigned as the nearest user to w from the set S ∪ {v}, given by v = mins∈S∪{v}∪X D(os, ow)
)
. Let us denote the
nearest user assigned to w before adding v to the set by v′. Then, we have:
fw(S ∪ v)− fw(S) = 1|W |
(
D(s, v′)−D(s, v))
≤ D(v, v
′)
|W | (10)
≤ α|W | (11)
Step 10 uses the triangular inequality of the underlying metric space. In step 11, the inequality holds by the definition of α.
Then, we have
f(S ∪ v)− f(S) =
∑
w∈W
(
fw(S ∪ v)−
∑
w∈W
f(S)
)
≤
∑
w∈W
α
|W | (12)
= α
The inequality in step 12 holds by using the result of step 11. Hence, the diversification parameter of the function Υf is bounded
by 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof directly follows from the results in Lemmas 2 3 4.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. Let SOPT be the set returned by OPT for Problem 2 without the privacy constraints. By the hypothesis
of the theorem, for each of the element s ∈ SOPT, the αrg neighborhood of s contains a set of at least 1/r · log(B/) users.
Furthermore, by hypothesis, these sets of size at least 1/r · log(B/) can be constructed to be mutually disjoint for every
s, s′ ∈ SOPT, let us denote these mutually disjoint sets by N˜αrg (s). Formally, this means that for s ∈ SOPT, we have
|N˜αrg (s)| ≥ 1/r · log(B/) and for any pairs of s, s′ ∈ SOPT, we have N˜αrg (s) ∩ N˜αrg (s) = ∅.
Recall that the simpler version of RANDGREEDY first samples the users from W at rate r to create a subset W˜ such that
|W˜ | = |W | · r. We first show that sampling at a rate r by RANDGREEDY ensures that with high probability (given by 1− ), at
least one user is sampled from N˜αrg (s) for each of the s ∈ SOPT. Consider the process of sampling for s and N˜αrg (s). Each of
the users in N˜αrg (s) has probability of being sampled given by r. Hence, the probability that none of the users in N˜αrg (s) are
included in W˜ for a given s is given by:
P
(
N˜αrg (s) ∩ W˜ = ∅
)
= (1− r)1/r·log(B/)
≤ e− log(B/)
= /B
By using union bound, the probability that none of the users in N˜αrg (s) gets included in W˜ for any s ∈ SOPT is bounded by 
(given by B · /B). Hence, with probability at least 1− , the sampled set W˜ contains at least one user from N˜αrg (s) for every
s ∈ SOPT.
This is equivalent to saying that, with probability at least 1 − , the W˜ contains a set S˜OPTαrg that can be obtained by replacing
every s ∈ SOPT with some w ∈ Nαrg (s), and hence f(S˜OPTαrg ) ≥ f(SOPT)− αrg · λf ·B (by using the definition of smoothness
property). And, running the GREEDY on W˜ ensures that the utility obtained is at least (1−1/e)·f(S˜OPTαrg ). Hence, with probability
at least (1− ),
E[f(RANDGREEDY)] ≥ (1− 1/e) · f(S˜OPTαrg )
≥ (1− 1/e) · (f(OPT)− αrg · λf ·B)
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3. Let SGREEDY be the set returned by GREEDY for Problem 2 without the privacy constraints. By the
hypothesis of the theorem, for each of the element s ∈ SGREEDY, the αspg neighborhood of s contains a set of at least 1/r users.
The loss of utility for the procedure SPGREEDY compared w.r.t to GREEDY at iteration i can be attributed to two following
reasons: (1) obfuscation of s∗i with set ψ(s
∗
i ) to select s˜
∗
i , where the size of ψ(s
∗
i ) is 1/r, and (2) removal of the entire set ψ(s
∗
i )
for further consideration. We analyze these two factors separately to get the desired bounds on the utility of SPGREEDY.
We being by stating a more general result on the approximation guarantees of GREEDY from (Krause and Guestrin 2005) when
the submodular objective function can only be evaluated approximately within an absolute error of . Results from (Krause and
Guestrin 2005) states that the utility obtained by this noisy greedy selection is guaranteed to be at least
(
(1−1/e)·OPT−2··B),
where B is the budget.
Now, consider an alternate procedure that operates similar to SPGREEDY, by obfuscating s∗i with set ψ(s
∗
i ) to pick s˜
∗
i at each
iteration i. However, this alternate procedure does not eliminate the entire set of users ψ(s∗i ) from the pool, but only removes
s˜∗i . Instead, it tags the users of ψ(s
∗
i ) \ {s˜∗i } as <invalid, i>, i.e. these users are marked as invalid and are tagged with the
iteration i at which they became invalid (in case a user was already marked as invalid, the iteration tag is not updated). Let
us denote this alternate procedure by SPGREEDY. This can alternatively be viewed as similar to GREEDY, though it can pick
the user at every iteration only approximately, because of the noise added by obfuscation. We now bound the absolute value of
this approximation error at every iteration. As s∗i is obfuscated with a set of users of size 1/r nearest to s
∗
i from the hypothesis
of the theorem, we are certain that set ψ(s∗i ) is contained within a radius of αspg neighborhood. Now, from the smoothness
assumptions, the maximum absolute error that could be introduced by the obfuscation compared to greedy selection (i.e. the
difference in marginal utilities of s∗i and s˜∗i ) at a given iteration i is bounded by λf · αspg . Hence, the utility obtained by
SPGREEDY can be lower-bounded as:
f(SPGREEDY) ≥ (1− 1/e) · OPT − 2 · λf · αspg ·B (13)
Next, we consider the loss associated with the removal of entire set ψ(s∗i ) at iteration i. Let us consider the execution of
SPGREEDY and let l + 1 be the first iteration when the obfuscation set ψ(s∗l+1) created by the procedure contains at least
one element marked as invalid, with the associated iteration of invalidity as k. Note that when l + 1 > B, there is no loss
associated with this step of removing ψ(s∗i ) and hence we only consider the case when l + 1 ≤ B. As the users are embedded
in euclidean space, this means that the αspg centered around s∗l+1 and s
∗
k overlaps and hence D(s
∗
l+1, s
∗
k) ≤ 2 · αspg . From the
diversification assumption, this means that the marginal utility of s∗l+1 cannot be more than 2 · υf · αspg . And, furthermore, the
submodularity ensures that for all j > l + 1, the marginal utility of users selected can only be lesser than the marginal utility
of s∗l+1.
Let us consider a truncated version of SPGREEDY that stops after l steps, denoted by SPGREEDYV , where V denotes the
fact that this procedure is always valid as it never touches invalid marked users. The utility of the truncated version can be
lower-bounded as follows:
f(SPGREEDYV ) ≥ f(SPGREEDY)− (B − l) · (2 · υf · αspg)
≥ f(SPGREEDY)− 2 · υf · αspg ·B
≥ (1− 1/e) · OPT − (2 · λf + 2 · υf ) · αspg ·B (14)
The step 14 follows by using the result in step 13. For the first l iterations, the execution of the mechanism SPGREEDY is
exactly same as SPGREEDYV . Hence, SPGREEDY acquires utility at least that acquired by SPGREEDYV , which completes the
proof.
